

BULLETPROOF? You Be The Judge

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INTRODUCTION

I'm Cliff Chadderton of The War Amps. In this film we shall be making reference to quite a few published documents from our own library. And I would like to take you very quickly through some of them. Here we see, for example, *The History of The North Shore Regiment*; *The History of Canada's Black Watch*.

Getting on to the Air Force, this is the biography of Boom Trenchard who was the father of aerial bombing. *The Allied Bomber War* was written in 1992, his very latest of English books on the whole issue of aerial bombing and Bomber Command. Just going along, this is *Bomber Harris* by Dudley Saward. He was Harris' official biographer. This is an excellent book, *The Bomber Offensive* by Anthony Verrier. Anyone writing about aerial bombardment and bomber command must have *The Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book*. This is a great book by a couple of Canadians -- *Reap The Whirlwind* by Dunmore and Carter. *A Thousand Shall Fall* was written by Murray Peden of Winnipeg, generally considered as the best personal narrative of any bomber pilot out of World War Two. This is Bomber Offensive, this is Air Marshall Harris's own personal account of what it was like to head Bomber Command in World War Two. John Terraine, who wrote *The Right of the Line*. And you will notice that this book is not in the shelf at all, it doesn't belong here. Although it is about Bomber Command, it was written by Max Hastings, a newspaper man working out of London, England. If you wanted to find a reference source which told all the bad terrible things and put them into the worst possible light about what Bomber Command did in World War Two, this is your book.

This is a film outlining statements in *The Valour and The Horror* regarding Bomber Command and The Battle of Normandy, and rebuttals found in published volumes by historical writers. The authors of *The Valour and the Horror* have said their research was "BULLETPROOF". You be the Judge!!.

There has been a great deal of controversy about *The Valour and The Horror*, particularly segment two, which dealt with Bomber Command. The War Amps received hundreds, in fact thousands, of requests from Canadians asking what is this all about? Why did these people go out and challenge what our young men did in World War Two? I can't answer that. I can tell you, however, that The War Amps decided to go what we call the legislatively mandated route. We put the whole matter in front of the CRTC and, as a forerunner to going to the CRTC, we asked the CBC Ombudsman to review this program. On November the 10th of 1992 the Ombudsman's report was released. It was a very strong condemnation of that film.

The public dialogue that followed the Ombudsman's report was very strong in this country. But what was lacking was documented evidence which supported the Ombudsman and which really knock into a copped hat the theories and the scenarios in *The Valour and The Horror*. What we would intend to do today is to make reference to the historical documentation which indicated that *The Valour and The Horror* was on the wrong track. Now The War Amps have produced this film with private financing, and we accept total responsibility for everything that we say here.

You know, *The Valour and The Horror* reminds me very much of what took place several years ago when the National Film Board did a production on the life of the late Billy Bishop V.C. Now that was called "*The Kid Who Couldn't Miss*", and it indicated that Bishop was not the hero which traditional historians and, in fact, which all research since has indicated that he was.

BOMBING POLICY

CLIFF: Okay, lets go to the first segment on Bomber Command. Let's talk first about bombing policy. The film said:

"The so-called area bombing of German cities was neither justified nor necessary."

The film went on to say:

"The official policy of "area bombings" of German cities was not tactically sound and the objectives of the Allies could have been achieved by precision bombing of industrial and military targets."

Let's see what the historians have to say about that.

VOICE 1: The British Air Ministry undertook a study of bombing practices, and concluded that attempts to hit specific targets, through precision bombing, were impractical. Martin Middlebrook, one of the most prolific authors on Bomber Command, quotes the new policy in his book, *The Bomber Command War Diaries*:

"The only way to win the war was to defeat Germany. The bombing of Germany on a scale sufficiently great to cause a German domestic collapse was the only alternative to a costly invasion and prolonged continental land campaign."

As a basis for the new policy the Joint Chiefs of Staff had declared, as stated in *The Bomber Command War Diaries*:

"We must first destroy the foundation upon which the German War Machine runs - the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it, and the hopes of victory which inspire it. Only then shall we be able to return to the Continent and occupy and control portions of his territory and impose our will upon the enemy. It is in bombing, on a scale undreamt of in the last war, that we find the new weapon on which we must principally depend for the destruction of German economic life and morale."

The new policy is further explained in the book *The Bomber Command War Diaries* as follows:

"The Air Ministry could now devote itself to the means by which the reprieved Bomber Command was to continue its campaign. The next decision was a momentous one. There had always been a body of opinion which believed that the general bombing of German cities, if on large-enough scale, would produce such general dislocation and break-down in civilian morale in the target cities that the German homefront would collapse. With their cities and their own homes in ruins, the German civilians would be neither able or willing to continue the war; so went the argument. The Butt Report had showed that accurate bombing of specific industrial premises could only rarely be achieved. The Air Ministry decided that such bombing should virtually be abandoned, that most of Bomber Command's effort should all be devoted to the general bombing of most densely built-up areas of Germany's cities."

VOICE 6: Noble Frankland in *Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany* gives further emphasis to the requirement for strategic bombing:

"The aim of strategic bombing, as was repeatedly stressed in the directives, was to undermine Germany to a point at which her capacity to fight would be fatally weakened. In other words, it was to open the way for military victory."

THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND AREA BOMBING

CLIFF: The film deals with the U.S. Air Force and area bombing, and it says

"The American daylight bombing policy was adopted, at least in part, because the United States was opposed to area bombings."

Sorry, but the historians don't agree.

VOICE: 2 In the book, *The Bomber Offensive*, by Anthony Verrier, the assertion is made:

"...apart from the fact that really accurate bombing cannot be carried out repeatedly, the pattern of the Eighth Air Force's bombing in the closing stages of the War was such as to preclude single industries being selected for the destruction. Increasingly in the last months, attention was turned towards the Ruhr or what was left of it."

Further on the subject of U.S. Air Force bombing tactics, we quote from the book *Reap The Whirlwind*, by William Carter:

"Indeed, except for the famous 'dams' raid in mid May, there were no attempts at precision bombing during this period. Webster and Frankland, authors of *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany*, concluded that a precision bombing campaign would have been a waste of effort."

Anthony Verrier of *The Bomber Offensive*, says further:

"General Spaatz's U.S. Air Forces increasingly came to adopt the area bombing strategy of Bomber Command. The methods of blind bombing came to be the rule and not the exception in the

U.S. Air Force, as, since early 1943, they had been for Bomber Command."

AIR MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR HARRIS

CLIFF: Now we deal with Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris. The film says:

"Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, was a heartless commander who needlessly sacrificed his air crews and who took perverse satisfaction in the killing of German civilians."

I think we will have to check this one out very, very closely, with those people who served with Harris and wrote about him, and also with a number of the air historians.

VOICE 1: The author of *The Bomber Command War Diaries* states:

"Area bombing was the creation of Sir Charles Portal and the staff officers of the Air Ministry, with the enthusiastic support being given by people such as Churchill and Boom Trenchard, the veteran RAF leader of the old school. There is no evidence that there had been any canvassing of the area bombing policy by the staff of Bomber Command headquarters."

In defence of Harris, *The Bomber Command War Diaries* states further:

"...but Harris did not rush blindly into sending the bombers out too often. His first few months were characterized by long periods of steady development, interrupted by bursts of dramatic activity.

Harris was not prepared to waste effort in conditions which experience had shown to be almost without any hope of success."

Dudley Saward in *Bomber Harris* quotes his old commander:

VOICE 3: "I take little delight in the work, and none whatever in risking my crews unavoidably."

VOICE 2: Anthony Verrier, in *The Bomber Offensive*, supports Harris:

"Harris had grasped this point much earlier than any of his confrères and his argument that the Ruhr was the great target for destruction and fatally weakened Germany was based on his understanding of its overall importance, not on the significance of individual industries."

VOICE 3: Concerning precision bombing, Harris indicates in his memoir, *Bomber Offensive*, that it was simply not practical. He states:

"There was also the fact that, after the policy of attacking key factories had broken down, no obvious alternative except an attack on morale presented itself at once; it was only after careful study of the Blitz in England that it was observed how immediate and serious was the effect on war production itself of the destruction of large town areas."

CLIFF: **In the film Harris is quoted as saying:**

"We shall destroy Germany's will to fight. Now that we have the planes and crew, in 1943 and 1944, we shall drop one and

one-quarter million tons of bombs; render twenty-five million Germans homeless; kill nine hundred thousand and seriously injure one million."

That statement has to be checked out against the historical record. It is simply not accurate.

VOICE 1: These actual statistics, as quoted in *Bomber Harris* by Dudley Saward, were from an estimate of Chief of Air Staff Sir Charles Portal. The implication that these were, in fact, the words of Sir Arthur Harris is misleading.

VOICE 3: According to the book *Bomber Offensive* by Sir Arthur Harris, the decision to bomb cities was neither secret nor conceived by himself. He stated:

"The decision to build a great force of bombers for strategic attack on industries and communications was made long before the war. The decision to attack large industrial areas instead of key factories was made before I became Commander-in-Chief."

Sir Arthur Harris states further:

"The switchover from precision to area bombing from attacking key factories or even individual sections of key factories, to attacking large industrial towns as a whole, had been made sometime before I took over command.

"The decision to concentrate on the complete destruction of four Ruhr cities with a view to breaking German morale was conveyed to the Command just before I took over, but attacks on whole cities and an offensive primarily against morale were under discussion in

the summer of 1941, when I was in America. At least by the early summer of 1941, everyone who had anything to do with staff policy knew that the great majority of our attacks on Germany were in fact, though not in intention, area attacks."

VOICE 1: In further regard to the reference by the film producers to the name "Butcher" Harris, we cite the views of Martin Middlebrook, author of *The Bomber Command War Diaries*, *The Peenemunde Raid*, *The Battle of Hamburg*, *The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission*, and *The Berlin Raids*. From his definitive book, *The Nuremburg Raid*, he states:

"To the press and the public Harris was 'Bomber' Harris and to his close associates, Bert. To his crews, however, he was always known as 'Butch', short for the Butcher. This term must be explained carefully. His men recognized Harris as a hard-driving commander who would not hesitate to send men to their deaths for as long as the war lasted. But they recognized also that all this was necessary for final victory. If anything went wrong it was always 'Butch' who was cursed, but rarely with real malice."

HARRIS AND INVASION TARGETS

CLIFF: Now we deal with **Harris and Invasion Targets**. The film says:

"Air Marshal Harris had at first objected to giving up his bombing of German cities so that his crews could take on invasion targets."

Again, the historians have to have their say.

VOICE 1: *The Bomber Command War Diaries* by Martin Middlebrook states:

"Despite his reservations about the new role, mainly over the ability of his force to hit the many small targets allocated to it without killing too many friendly civilians, Harris gave full and loyal support to the directions he received, both in the preparation for the invasion and support of the first weeks of the land battle.

"The official date for the transference of the main Bomber Command effort to pre-invasion targets was April 14, 1944 but that date was almost meaningless. Harris had already made a modest start on the new list of targets in March."

Saward's book *Bomber Harris* includes an excerpt from a letter sent on September 25, 1944 by General Eisenhower to General Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army:

"You might be interested to know, in view of earlier expressed fears that Air Chief Marshal Harris would not willingly devote his command to the support of ground operations, that he actually proved to be one of the most effective and cooperative members of this team."

VOICE 5: A clearcut explanation of the reasons for Air Marshal Harris's intransigence regarding the commitment of his Bomber Command forces, in regard to support for Overlord, is given in Maurice Harvey's *The Allied Bomber War*. He suggests that:

"Harris and his U.S. counterpart, General "Tooy" Spaatz were still operating in accordance with the tactical requirements dictated to them by the Casablanca Conference and Pointblank.

"Also, Harris was afraid of the consequences of allowing Germany a respite from the sustained assault from British and U.S. bombers. Maurice Harvey's views are quoted from his book as follows: **The immediate tactical requirements of Operation Overlord thus increasingly came into direct conflict with the strategic objectives of Pointblank.**"

WERE BOMBER CREWS (OR THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT) AWARE OF THEIR TARGETS?

CLIFF: **Were Bomber Crew or the Canadian Government Aware of Their Targets? The film says:**

"The crews of Bomber Command were not aware their targets were civilians."

The film says

"The Canadian Government was not advised of the "secret" directive to bomb civilians."

Those two statements need a little more examination, from the historical perspective.

VOICE 5: Murray Peden, author of *A Thousand Shall Fall*, and himself a bomber pilot during the war, stated:

"By the time the Combined Bomber Offensive was in full swing, every bomber was equipped with a camera linked to the bomb-release and the flare-release mechanisms. As soon after the raid as smoke or cloud permitted, photo reconnaissance aircraft took daylight pictures of the target damage to supplement crews' night photos.

"Not only were these groups of target photos collated and put on display for the operational crews in each stations' Intelligence Section, they were often set up beside the photo reconnaissance shots when those came in to show the crews more graphically what had been accomplished in a given strike. Air crews were encouraged to visit the Intelligence Section to study the data."

VOICE 4: Walter Thompson, a former bomber pilot with forty-eight operational flights to his credit, including a stint as a Pathfinder, states in his much-recommended book *Lancaster to Berlin*:

"The best way to put an industry out of action is to kill everyone who works in it -- Ghengis Khan knew that! And so one is carried on the tide. One sometimes swims against it, sometimes with it but it is the tide which moves, and even exceptional individuals who ride the crest of that tide are as much part of it as are the rest of us. There was no longer any feeling in Bomber Command that we were attacking industrial targets. We were desperately trying to win a war with air power alone."

VOICE 7: Was the Canadian Government aware of the so-called secret directive to bomb civilians? The film script states that the area bombing directives, set out in the Portal Memorandum of February 14, 1942 were not known and/or communicated to the Canadian Government.

The following is a statement by the Right Honourable Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada:

"Total war means an indiscriminate attack on every front, by every means, however fiendish. Practised by the Nazis, as we have seen, it is war against homes, hospitals, schools and churches. It is war on men, women and children."

Mackenzie Kings' statement was made in a radio broadcast on February 2, 1941. The Portal Memorandum was dated February 14, 1942. This would appear to effectively challenge the suggestion in the film script that Canada was unaware of the policy which would see the bombing of German civilians.

In fact, Mackenzie King -- renowned as a pacifist -- all of his life -- is seen using words as: "...was against homes, hospitals, schools and churches. It is war on men, women and children."

CHURCHILL AND THE BOMBING OF CITIES

CLIFF: **Churchill and the Bombing of Cities. The film says:**

"Sir Winston Churchill, towards the end of the war, had been critical of the bombing of German cities."

We will have to go to the historical records to check out the accuracy of that statement.

VOICE 3: Much reference has been made to a memorandum issued by Winston Churchill in which he questions the policy of bombing German cities. According to the book *Bomber Harris* by Dudley Saward, Winston Churchill withdrew this memorandum two days later, after hearing Sir Charles Portal read the following written by Air Marshal Harris:

"...to suggest that we have bombed German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, and to speak of our offensive as including mere acts of terror and wanton destruction is an insult, both to the bombing policy of the Air Ministry and to the manner in which that policy has been executed by Bomber Command. We have never gone in for terror bombing and the attacks we have made in accordance with my directive have in fact produced the strategic consequences for which they

were designed and from which the armies now profit."

VOICE 6: John Terraine, author of *The Right of The Line*:

"The recoil of the destruction of Dresden began early, long before the details of it were known. Churchill, on March 28, 1945, told Portal that it 'remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing.' The official historians call this 'perhaps the least felicitous' of Churchill's wartime minutes, and he did in fact withdraw it, substituting another on April 1, which simply called for a review of area bombing 'from the point of view of our own interests'."

LACK OF MORAL FIBRE

CLIFF: The film then deals with a very contentious issue, the lack of moral fibre.

The film seems to be saying that the "lack of moral fibre" may have implied some degree of cowardice on the part of bomber crews.

VOICE 1: In the book *The Bomber Command War Diaries*, the following comments are noted:

"Much has been written about the morale of the bomber crews and the degree by which it fell during the Battle of Berlin. What Bomber Command suffered from in the Battle of Berlin was not a widespread drop in morale, but a deterioration of efficiency caused by adverse weather, the longer routes which had to be employed and which forced more fuel to be carried at the expense of bomb tonnage, and the steadily increasing casualties which led to a even greater reliance on inexperienced crews."

VOICE 2: In their book, *Reap The Whirlwind*, Dunmore and Carter deal with the lack of moral fibre concept in a sympathetic manner:

"It was an inexplicable attitude for, from the grisly slaughter of the daylight raids in 1939 to the wholesale destruction of hundreds of four-engine bombers and their crews over Germany in 1943 and 1944, the **only** thing the authorities didn't have to worry about was the willingness of their young air crews to set off for whatever target they were told to bomb, night after night, no matter what the conditions."

THE HAMBURG RAIDS

CLIFF: The Hamburg Raids.

"The bombing of Hamburg, in such a manner as to create a firestorm, was described as "cruel and inhumane," and probably unnecessary."

Let's go to sources such as Winston Churchill, and others who wrote about World War Two, and see if they agree.

VOICE 2: From *Closing The Ring*, by Winston Churchill, the following is noted:

"The four attacks against Hamburg from July 24 to August 3 caused greater destruction than had ever been suffered by so large a city in so short a time. The air battle of Hamburg has been described by many Germans as 'the great catastrophe.' Speer, the German Munitions Minister, himself admitted after the war that he

had calculated that if similar attacks had been delivered in quick succession against six other major German cities, it would have led to a breakdown of war production."

VOICE 1: Dudley Saward says in *Bomber Harris*:

"Hamburg was a major seaport of great military and industrial importance. The Bismark was built in Hamburg and almost one-half of all U boats, four hundred submarines in total, were built by Hamburg's larger shipyard, Blohm Voss."

VOICE 4: The film, *The Valour and The Horror* characterizes the attack on Hamburg in a sinister light. It is of interest to note the comment of the authors of *Bombers: The Weapon of Total War*:

"The choice of Hamburg was made for several reasons: it was just sufficiently close to the UK to permit a British bomber force to undertake the entire operation during the short summer nights. Hamburg was a major shipbuilding and industrial city. The Hamburg targets included an oil refinery and over three thousand factories, all either directly or indirectly engaged in supplying the German war economy."

The strategic value of Hamburg raids is also noted:

"After the raids, Goebbels was to note in his diary that the attacks had been 'a catastrophe, the extent of which simply staggers the imagination'. More pointedly, Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, stated after the war that he held the opinion that if the RAF had followed up the Hamburg raids with similar attacks on four or five other German cities, it could have ended the war in 1943."

THE BERLIN RAIDS

CLIFF: **The Berlin Raids. The film says:**

"The raids on Berlin were "terror bombing" with no strategic objective."

I think again we will have to look at what the historians have said about that.

VOICE 1: Martin Middlebrook, in *The Berlin Raids* states:

"The Battle of Berlin obviously reduced Germany's war effort and made a contribution to victory. Every anti-aircraft gun or fighter aircraft kept back to defend Berlin was one less which might otherwise be serving at the fighting fronts. Berlin was itself a front. Every pane of glass broken in Berlin was a tiny drain on Germany's economy; every bomb that hit a small workshop or large armaments factory was a direct blow against the war effort; and every workman killed or prevented from coming to work because his family had been bombed out was one less man producing war material."

THE DAM RAIDS

CLIFF: **The Dam Raids, known to all of us as the famous Dam Buster Raids. This is what *The Valour and The Horror* says:**

"The raid of the German dams, though costly in terms of lives of bomber crews and Germans, was a "public relations effort",

and the film goes on to say:

"and the resulting damage to the German war effort questionable."

Surely we have to look at what the historians have said about the results of the dam raids and why they took place.

VOICE 2: Sir Winston Churchill, in *Closing The Ring* casts some doubt upon reports of German armament production generally. He states:

"In the reports submitted to Hitler, which must of course be taken with reserve, it was claimed that German armament production was doubled in 1942. Remembering our own loss output under much less severe bombing, this assertion is difficult to credit. The Germans admitted that production was almost stationary in 1943, and this is evidence of the increasing power of Bomber Command."

VOICE 3: Air Marshal Harris also explains, in *Bomber Offensive*, the strategic purposes of the Dam Raids:

"...the Mohne dam was designed to supply water for the Ruhr...

"...the Eder dam was primarily intended not to provide water for industry, but to prevent flooding of agricultural land, to make the river Weiser more navigable, and to supply some of the water for the Mitteland Canal."

VOICE 5: A further explanation of the effect on the "Dam Buster Raids" is given in the new book *The Allied Bomber War* by Wing Commander Maurice Harvey. He states:

"The impact on the Ruhr industry was less severe than expected even though more than one thousand civilians died and thousands were made homeless. One indirect benefit was that seven thousand men had to be transferred from preparing the Atlantic wall defences to rebuild the Mohne dam which was accomplished within four months. Although the economic results were in retrospect somewhat disappointing, the boost to Allied morale was enormous, not least in Bomber Command itself. Full advantage was made of the publicity fall-out even if secrecy was maintained as to the methods employed. Of greater significance, however, were the pointers for the direction which bomber operations might take in the future."

VOICE 1: Regarding The Dam Raids of May 16 and 17, 1943, the author of *The Bomber Command War Diaries* states:

"The breaching of the Mohne and Eder Dams were major achievements. The Mohne Reservoir contained nearly one hundred and forty million tons of water and was the major source of supply for the industrial Ruhr area twenty miles away. The water released caused widespread flooding and disruption of rail, road and canal communications and of the supply of electricity and water. The water-supply network was particularly affected by the silting up of pumping stations by the flood water. It is not possible to state the effect of all this upon industrial production in precise terms but there was certainly some disruption and water rationing was enforced until the winter rains came and filled the reservoirs again.

"The Eder dam was even larger than the Mohne, containing two hundred and ten million tons of water...and the inland waterway

system in the Kassel area was more affected by the attack on the Eder than was the Ruhr area."

THE NUREMBERG RAID

CLIFF: **The Nuremburg Raid.**

"The raid on Nuremburg, late in the war, was depicted as a deliberate attempt to destroy a historically significant target which had no strategic focus."

Sir Winston Churchill laid in pretty heavily on that one, and other historians as well. I think we will have to look at what they said.

VOICE 2: Winston Churchill claimed that there was an important strategic aspect to the bombing of Nuremburg. In *Closing The Ring*, Churchill said:

"On March 30 and 31, 1944, out of seven hundred and ninety-five aircraft dispatched by British Bomber Command against Nuremburg, ninety four did not return. This was our heaviest loss in one raid, and caused Bomber Command to re-examine its tactics before launching further deep-penetration attacks by night into Germany. But by forcing the enemy to concentrate his strength on defending inner Germany, the Western Allies gained the complete air superiority which they needed for the approaching cross-Channel invasion."

CLIFF: Further to Nuremburg, the narrator says, and we quote:

"So anxious was Harris to destroy Nuremburg that he scheduled a bombing mission there on a night with clear moonlight, when crews would normally have been allowed to stand down."

That statement really has to be examined from the point of view of those who were there, and those who knew why the Nuremburg raid was carried on.

VOICE 5: This question is dealt with in specific detail in the Foreword to Maurice Harvey's new book *The Allied Bomber War*. Group Captain Hamish Mahaddie, who served on Harris's staff after a distinguished career in air crew, states in the foreword:

"I feel I must return briefly to the sad story of Nuremburg which may be known as the lost battle of Bomber Command. I have gone to considerable lengths to research the decision to mount this unfortunate mission which should never have been allowed to happen. After a telebroadcast to Group Commanders on the results of the met reconnaissance flight, Don Bennett, supported strongly by Roddy Carr of Four Group, pressed to scrub that night. However, the Command plus the rest of the Group AOCs headed by Five Group stressed equally strongly that the sortie should take place as planned, and this was the view of Command Met. Thus the day was carried by a majority vote."

THE "MORALITY" ISSUE

CLIFF: The morality issue. The film suggests, and I quote,

"Because of the manner in which the Allies conducted the war

(primarily the bombing offensive against German cities), they relinquished the 'moral high ground'."

Was this intended as a comparison with the criminal behaviour of Nazi Germany?

Seriously now, we have to examine what the historians have said about this whole morality issue.

VOICE 6: Noble Frankland states in *Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany*:

"Even this, the moral issue, must to some extent be governed by what the bombing achieved in terms of the defeat of Hitler's Germany, for clearly there is a difference between destruction for the sake of destruction and destruction for the sake of victory.

"In the light of such desiderata, it may now be asked if the strategic air offensive of the Second World War, which inevitably meant widespread death and destruction far beyond the lines, was morally permissible and, in particular, if this was so in view of the fact that much of the British effort consisted of area bombing in which the deliberate intention was the destruction of town centres.

"Until 1944, strategic bombing was the only means by which offensive pressure of any significant kind could be exerted by Britain against Germany. If the strategic air offensive had not been initiated and sustained, the strategic prospects of Hitler's being defeated would have been gravely jeopardized. It is difficult to see how Britain could have carried on the War from 1940 to 1944."

CLIFF: In *Death By Moonlight*, the narrator speaks about the German night fighters, stating:

"They ended the war morally undefeated. They had the

advantage of knowing what they were fighting for."

Are they suggesting that, on the Allied side, we did not? Again, we have to look at what the historians and the writers who knew what was going on, what they actually did say.

VOICE 3: To review from Air Marshal Harris's book, *Bomber Offensive*, the German civilians:

"...had been promised they would never be bombed; what, then, must be the effect of English bombers four thousand pounders night after night?

"...the race for the atom bomb was on, and we knew that the Germans had just as much chance of getting it, and just as good facilities for making it, as anyone else."

Bomber Harris goes on to say:

"A bomber offensive was the only means that I could see, and the results eventually bore out this conclusion, of preventing the Allied armies from suffering enormous casualties when they eventually invaded the continent.

"...the bombing of Germany assumed great political importance as a means of persuading the Russians that we were doing all we could to come to their help."

VOICE 5: In his book, *The Allied Bomber War*, Wing Commander Maurice Harvey deals with the questions of area bombing and morality in the following terms:

"The strategic bomber offensive in the Second World War was an

immense undertaking. With the exception of the 'Battle of the Atlantic', it was the only major operation which ran without interruption from the very first day of the war right through to its dying moments nearly six years later.

"In later years, the official history fairly and dispassionately sets out the record in great detail to which all later historians are greatly indebted. Other authors have given their own interpretations of these fateful years, often with little consensus of view of what the bombing offensive actually achieved. Polemics have too often taken precedence over facts and sober analysis. The armchair author is susceptible only to a critic's unfavourable review; those actually fighting the war carry a far weightier burden. I have tried, and so should the reader, to place these into the context of the time."

VOICE 1: Martin Middlebrook, the author of some seven books on Bomber Command is, by any standards, an authority on the subject. His views regarding the morality of bombing civilians are set out in *The Nuremburg Raid* as follows:

"Close on the heels of the discussion as to whether the bomber campaign had been effective came the questioning of the morality of it. Had it been right to attempt to gain victory by adopting a policy that would result in the deaths of civilians and the destruction of historic buildings and treasures?"

"The German propagandists labelled the bomber crews as Terrorflieger but Bomber Command never, at any time, descended to the level of pure terrorism. The city attacked had always been of industrial, military or communications importance. The Germans

could have evacuated their cities of all but essential workers and then there would have been no 'innocent casualties'. The methods used were not forbidden by the Geneva Convention and were no worse in their effects than the slow starvation by naval blockade in the previous war which probably killed twice as many civilians as did the bombing.

"It is perhaps significant that in the post-war controversy, the least noise was made by the Germans themselves. Hitler had gone to war with most of Europe. The Nazis had systematically exterminated the Jewish race, had declared all Slavic peoples to the *Untermenschen* - sub-humans. The Gestapo had tortured and terrified throughout occupied Europe and countless thousands of innocent men and women had been dragged off to work in German factories almost as slaves. Post-war German historians realized that it was the Nazis who had sown the wind and the now-dead Hitler, whom they once followed so faithfully, received much of the blame for the retaliation."

VOICE 6: John Terraine in *The Right of the Line* states:

"On May 7 Nazi Germany surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The Nazi Empire was dead.

"The RAF did not give much thought to such matters on May 8; VE-Day was the day of relief and rejoicing. The last 'op' in Europe was over, the last bomb gone; now the Royal Air Force could quit with honour the arduous, illustrious station it had so long held on the right of the line."

VOICE 5: Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, former commanding general of Tactical Air Command, U.S. Air

Force from October 1942 to January 1944, wrote on the subject of morality of aerial bombing. His comments, written in 1988 as a foreword to Murray Peden's *A Thousand Shall Fall*, must be considered as relevant. This is particularly so because, in attempting to defend their thesis concerning strategic bombing, the film's producers have, on several occasions, implied that the U.S. Air Force did not make use of area bombing; and were, in fact, opposed to it.

Lieutenant General Eaker states:

"Sir Arthur Harris is now bearing the brunt of the charge of unnecessary 'civilian brutality' by RAF Bomber Command. No one knows better than I that such charges and claims are entirely false and wholly unfair. For nearly two years I had daily conferences with him, concerning features of our joint bombing effort, targets, weather, results of the previous day's attacks etc.

"With the revival of interest in the air campaigns of World War Two, much ill-conceived propaganda is being written, the general tenor of which is that RAF Bomber Command, under the leadership of Sir Arthur T. Harris, deliberately and without reason attacked civilians, including women and children. I can testify to the fallacy of this anti-humanitarian charge against British leadership, political and military.

"I had many appointments with Prime Minister Churchill in order to show him photographs of the U.S. Eighth Air Force strikes or to discuss with him the great advantage of round the clock bombing -- the British by night, the Americans by day.

"Never at any time did he propose or encourage wanton attacks on civilians. No bomber strike was ever scheduled which was not aimed at an important element of the enemy's war-making capacity.

"I can understand how present historians and pacifists with a pathological prejudice against warfare, even in defence of a nation and its people, can find some grounds which may be distorted to support such claims."

VOICE 4: From the book, *Bombers: The Weapon of Total War*, published in 1984:

"The natural reaction of the population of Britain, especially those in the bombed cities, was that the German civilians should suffer a similar fate. Winston Churchill understood their views but he also wanted German targets attacked for reasons other than that of revenge. Even when the Battle of Britain was at its height, Churchill had told the War Cabinet:

VOICE 2: "The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it...bombers alone provide the means of victory."

VOICE 4: It is not often mentioned, but Bomber Command's operations over Germany had a strong effect on flagging morale in Great Britain at the time.

The author continues:

"The night raids undoubtedly did cause a drop in German war production but it was relatively small; however, there was another important aspect of Bomber Command's raids on Germany which too many present-day critics of RAF strategy ignore: the effect on the morale of the population of Great Britain."

A factor which has to be considered, when weighing the difficulties of precision bombing, is the

lack of information on just where the military targets were. We quote:

"The navigators would be issued with the appropriate maps and the best available photographs of the target, though for industrial plants these were as a rule far from recent."

The positive effect of the Bomber Command campaign, in relation to the Normandy invasion, does not seem to have been stressed in the film *The Valour and The Horror*.

The authors of *Bombers: The Weapon of Total War* note:

"When the first Allied soldier set foot in Normandy on June 6, 1944, D-Day, it could be argued that the apostles of victory through strategic bombing had failed in their stated intention of bombing the Germans into submission. That contention was essentially correct; the Germans were by no means defeated in the summer of 1944 but, had there been no 'Pointblank' bombing offensive, it is most unlikely that the invasion could have been a feasible proposition.

"Albert Speer, who had assumed responsibility of Minister of Armaments for German war production in February 1944, would have been able, without the disruption of bombing, to produce a most formidable fighter force to oppose the Allied invasion, for which absolute air superiority was an essential prerequisite."

PART III

IN DESPERATE BATTLE - NORMANDY 1944

D DAY TO CAEN

CLIFF: I promised I would not put any personal comments in this, but I did serve as an infantry officer throughout the Normandy campaign. And, if I read once more that what has been going on in the public dialogue is veterans speaking, frankly I think I'm going to barf. This is not veterans speaking. This is what historians are saying.

Let's move on now to the Normandy Campaign. It was called *In Desperate Battle*. From the film, we see Corporal Joseph Le Boutillier of the North Shore Regiment is portrayed by an actor with a rifle, supposedly standing at the back of a landing craft. He states that he received an order from his officer that "if anyone refuses to leave the craft, you shoot him." We just have one reference that I think indicates whether this statement is true or not. And it's from *The History of The North Shore New Brunswick Regiment*. Let's listen to what it says.

VOICE 1: The description of the North Shore Regiment landing from the book *The North Shore New Brunswick Regiment* is relevant.

"At long last the hour had come, and every man of the North Shore was eager to reach the beach and get into action. The long waiting in cramped quarters aboard ship and the nauseating roll of the troop carriers made everyone anxious to put feet on solid ground and get on with the job."

CLIFF: When *The Valour and The Horror* deals with the issues of cowardice, we see this statement:

"In the First World War, soldiers who refused to go over the top were executed on the spot by battle police."

World War One historians would have a field day with that statement.

VOICE 6: The film's statement is contrary to KING'S REGULATIONS and the Manual of Military Law. A soldier charged with cowardice or desertion was given a court martial, and the whole concept of justice was involved.

John Terraine, in *The Right of the Line* outlines what transpired:

"In the First World War, when over eight and a half million men of the British Empire put on uniform, the two offences were listed as Cowardice and Desertion. Only five hundred and fifty-one court-martial charges of cowardice were brought, eighteen of which resulted in death sentences. Seven thousand, three hundred and sixty one charges of Desertion resulted in two hundred and sixty-six death sentences. For officers -- the broad equivalent of Bomber Command air crews -- the figures were: Cowardice, nine court-martial charges, no death sentence carried out. Desertion, eighteen charges, two death sentences carried out. The overwhelming impression of these figures -- upon this author at least -- is of the extraordinary degree of stamina and resolution, what used to be known as "grit", to be found in a very wide cross-section of people in World War One. The experience of the RAF in the Second World War displayed the same phenomenon."

CLIFF: **The film says:**

"that the Canadian Army was poorly trained and poorly led".

VOICE 7: In **The Official History of The Canadian Army: Six Years of War** by C.P. Stacey, there is a section dealing with the training of the army overseas.

The training state of the Canadian Army, going into the Battle of Normandy, was as well advanced as could have been accomplished, short of actual battle experience.

"There is no doubt that training can do just so much. The Canadians did well in Normandy; they would have done better had they not been fighting their first battle and learning as they fought."

CLIFF: In order to support their hypothesis that the Canadians were badly led, the film deals harshly with General Guy Simonds, and the producers even go so far as to extract "part" of a quote from Major General Harry Foster who commanded the 7th Infantry Brigade. Foster is quoted as saying:

"Simonds sets high standards -- impossible standards. I tried to talk to him after he ran roughshod over two of my senior officers. He, that is Simonds, said, "Somebody had to talk to them, Harry. I did, because you didn't.'"

Now that statement has been taken out of context, and we will indicate to you just where, and how, and why.

VOICE 2: It is presumed that the narrators are quoting from the book *Meeting Of Generals* by Tony Foster, General Foster's son. The inference from the quote is that General Foster had a poor opinion of General Simonds. If the producers had used the entire quote, the indication would have been quite different! The relevant quote is:

"Guy Simonds, in Harry's view, was 'the brightest tactical army commander Canada had produced in any war.' He had that amazing ability of being able to analyze any given situation swiftly and accurately, cutting through irrelevancies to the heart of the problem, then making up his mind. His orders were always clear, concise - straight to the point."

Harry Foster is quoted further as saying:

"No one could ever replace him, Guy Simonds was the best we had."

CLIFF: **The film says:**

"Once the beaches were penetrated, the opposition was light. Their job was to get down this road and help the British capture the road to Paris."

Before anyone can accept that statement, they better read quite a bit about this whole battle for Normandy. It wasn't that simple.

VOICE 7: An impartial account of the Canadians from D-Day to Caen is found in *The Canadians at War*. Some excerpts follow:

"D-Day had been a brilliant success. Now on D-plus-1, the Germans counter-attacked with the 12th SS and other divisions. The Allies tried to push inland in accordance with the ninety-day master plan for the Battle of Normandy.

"We would fight inland," said Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery, the overall ground commander, "then draw all the German strength we could -- particularly armoured strength -- onto the British-Canadian front. Here the Allies hoped to trap the Germans.

"As things turned out, it took not ninety days but seventy-five. The Canadians' task was tough, thankless and unspectacular, but it contributed mightily to making the plan work. As anticipated, the Germans expected a breakout so they did concentrate their armour on the British-Canadian front around Caen.

"The 12th SS now was little more than a remnant; its infantry strength was cut to that of a battalion and sixty-five of its one hundred and fifty tanks were gone. It would withdraw to refit and it would return, but it would never be the same again."

THE BOMBING OF CAEN

CLIFF: **The Bombing of Caen. "The bombing of the ancient city of Caen was unnecessary to the Normandy Campaign. Destroying the city and killing of its inhabitants did not provide any advantage to the Allies."**

The films goes on to say:

"Montgomery needed a "public relations" victory. The allies came to "destroy the city."

We have to go way back in history for this one. Ross Monroe was our Senior War Correspondent. Let's hear what he had to say, and let's hear what other historians since have had to say, about this accusation that Caen did not have to be destroyed by the RAF Bombers.

VOICE 7: As Ross Munro stated, in "*Gauntlet To Overlord*":

"This raid was in the nature of an experiment to determine whether heavy night bombers of Bomber Command could be satisfactorily employed in the direct support of ground troops, and the results proved so good that the heavies were subsequently used on every attack in France, where a strong defence line had to be shattered.

"For the troops opposing the British and Canadians -- the 12th SS Hitler Youth Division; the 16th German Air Force Division, an infantry formation formed from air force personnel; and the 21st Panzer Division, it was a devastating surprise and shock."

Matthew Halton was the senior CBC war correspondent. To him, the city of Caen looked like the end of the world. Halton's broadcast is quoted in *The Canadians at War*:

"To our astonishment we saw a great church, the famous Abbaye-aux-Hommes, one thousand years old, which not one bomb or shell had touched. All the inhabitants were calm and dignified but their enthusiasm was deep and touching. There was a ceremony in the square outside. The flag of France was raised and they sang 'La Marseillaise,' weeping, the broken and tortured voices of unbroken people."

CLIFF: **Still on Caen, the narrator states:**

"that an investigation of the ruins of Caen fail to turn up a single German body or any German equipment."

Let's look at the historical accuracy of that one.

VOICE 1: In the *Bomber Command War Diaries*, the author notes:

"The Canadian First and British Second Armies were held up by a series of fortified village strong points north of Caen. The first plan was for Bomber Command to bomb these villages but, because of the proximity of friendly troops and the possibility of

bombing error, the bombing area was moved back nearer to Caen, covering a stretch of open ground and the northern edge of the city."

CLIFF: **On Caen, the film continues:**

"Few Germans were killed in the area actually bombed, although units nearby were considerably shaken. The northern suburbs of Caen were ruined." That may be true, but we have to look at the tactical situation which existed in Caen at that time."

VOICE 7: The film *The Valour and The Horror* states that there was no tactical advantage. We quote from *The Victory Campaign*, by C.P. Stacey:

"A 21st Army Group Intelligence Summary of July 11, undoubtedly based upon the interrogation of prisoners, asserts: "The heavy bombing of Caen was decisive. 31 German Air Force Regiment lost its headquarters and 16 German Air Force and 12 SS Panzer Divisions were deprived of rations and ammunition for the crucial morning which followed."

Stacey concludes:

"The moral effect upon the German troops, and particularly upon the Luftwaffe Division, was probably very considerable. Fortunately, the inhabitants had been partly evacuated from the areas most heavily struck."

Stacey indicates the favourable reaction from the people of Caen as follows:

"No Canadian unit recorded any complaint of the warmth of the welcome; and the First Corps situation report for the day remarked, 'Inhabitants enthusiastic at Allied entry.'"

CLIFF: Now we come to the segment about the famous Black Watch at Verriers Ridge. I suggest anyone interested in going further into this, get a copy and read *The History of The Black Watch* by Paul Hutcheson. What does the film say?

"The tragedy which befell one Regiment - The Black Watch - was used to depict that the German SS troops were superior; the emphasis on this particular attack is presumably intended to portray the manner in which Canadian troops (including the Black Watch) were "manhandled" by the Germans in the Normandy Campaign."

Not only do we have to read *The History of The Black Watch*, but we have to read what the historians have said. Not just about Verriers Ridge, that was a very very small battle, but what the historians have said about that whole tremendous campaign, and the Canadian Army started in on "D" Day, and finally closed the gap at Falaise, which was the beginning of the end for the German Army in France.

VOICE 8: Disastrous as it was, there is no justification that the Battle at Fontenay should have been singled out. Hutchison's book gives a graphic description, but places the battle in perspective of the contribution of this famous regiment to the entire North West European campaign. The author states:

"Major F.P. Griffin then took charge and decided to clear St. Martin and St. André of the enemy before proceeding further. This attack was fairly successful, the Battalion capturing many prisoners of the Hitler Division and pushing a patrol forward to May which was found to be still in the hands of the enemy. It was obvious that

the second phase of the advance had failed and that the Battalion's start line had not been cleared by the troops in front. Nevertheless, Griffin received orders by wireless to move against May. He was told he would be supported by tank and artillery fire."

VOICE 5: Another indication that the Black Watch attack at Fontenay should not have been singled out for particular reference, may be found in the book *Out of The Shadows* by Douglas and Greenhouse, Department of National Defence. They do not mention the battle at all, stating only:

"Pressure must therefore be maintained on the Germans in the vicinity of Caen, and in mid-July a series of attacks was launched that gained little ground but cost Montgomery's forces dearly."

VOICE 7: In vindication of Major Phil Griffin's decision to attack Fontenay, we note from Stacey's book *The Victory Campaign*, that it was thought that a Canadian Battalion "was firmly in possession of Verrieres.'

Stacey's report continues:

"At 3:30 a.m., the Black Watch moved into a forward assembly area in St. Martin. They found that there were still enemy in the village, and time was lost in clearing it in the darkness. During this process the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Cantlie, was mortally wounded by machine gun fire. The same burst wounded the Senior Company Commander and the command evolved upon Major Griffin. It was now too late to carry out the attack according to the original timetable, which called for artillery support at fixed times. Pending the making of a new plan coordinated with the artillery and tanks, Major Griffin moved the Battalion into St.

André. He also sent a patrol to May. It entered the place and got the impression that it was not strongly held by the Germans."

If the film producers desired to tell the full story of that part of the Normandy Battle from Caen to Falaise, they might well have used, as a guide, the description in *Canadians At War*. It states:

"It is roughly twenty miles from Caen to Falaise. The hard, black road runs south through quiet, rustic country dotted with villages and small towns and clumps of forest and gentle ridges. That summer of 1944, it became the axis of Canadian advance -- and a scarlet memory in Canadian military lore.

"For the Second Infantry and Fourth Armoured Divisions, it became a place of learning, a much more brutal place than Sicily had been for the First Division a year before. Here they were thrown into one of the great battles of history. They were green, and it showed, but they were brave and that showed too.

"The entire Canadian corps played a decisive role in the final stages of the Battle for the Gap.

"The Germans had lost a great battle and suffered tremendous losses since June 6th.

"The victory in Normandy did not end the campaign. But Hitler had lost the armies that were his best hope of staving off ultimate disaster. This, said Montgomery, was the beginning of the end..."

CLIFF: This series is titled *The Valour and The Horror*. Let's just look at how the producers dealt

with one part of that; "The Valour". The narrator states:

"At this point in Normandy, psychiatric collapse was skyrocketing -- responsible for almost one of every three casualties".

Let's look at the history on that one.

VOICE 1: Regarding battle exhaustion and the role of the infantrymen in Normandy, the book *Maple Leaf Route: Falaise* by Copp and Vogel provides an interesting insight:

"For the riflemen, the fighting in Normandy was every bit as brutal and costly as the battles on the Western Front in World War One. These men bore an incredibly disproportionate share of the casualties, at least seventy percent of the total. Riflemen also carried most of the burden of psychoneurotic breakdown, usually called battle exhaustion in World War Two. Canadian army psychiatrists soon learned that each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of exposure. Psychiatric casualties are as inevitable as gunshot and shrapnel wounds.

"Psychiatry, like the other branches of medicine, underwent rapid development in World War Two and battle exhaustion was treated sensibly and quickly with rest, sedation and, where necessary, reassignment away from the front line."

CLIFF: **I'm not at all certain that this comes under the heading of "Valour", but let's look at the way this film series examines the shooting of unarmed prisoners of war. From the film:**

"The murder of prisoners of war was described as a "black mark" on both sides, implying that Canadian troops shot prisoners to the same extent that the war trials indicated the murder of unarmed Canadian troops by German SS".

The narrator states:

"The story of what happened to prisoners of war on both sides of this battle is one of the darkest chapters of the Second World War".

On both sides? Most Canadians know there were war trials after the war, and that at least one German General, Kurt Meyer, was tried, found guilty, and in fact sentenced to death, although it was never carried out, for the shooting of unarmed Canadians. There is no evidence whatsoever that Canadians ever shot German POW's. So again, I think we have to go to the historians and see what they say about this.

VOICE 6: There is no controversy. The evidence was uncovered by the Canadian Army Number One Field Investigation Unit, and Kurt Meyer, was found guilty by a court martial and sentenced to death-- a sentence later commuted by the late Major General Chris Vokes of the Canadian Army of Occupation.

From the book *The Trial of Kurt Meyer* by Lieutenant Colonel Bruce MacDonald, the charges of which Kurt Meyer was found guilty were as follows:

"Incited and counselled troops under his command to deny quarter to Allied troops.

"Was responsible for the killing of prisoners of war in violation of the laws and usages of war, when troops under his command shot

and killed seven Canadian prisoners of war at his Headquarters at L'Ancienne Abbaye Ardenne.

"Was responsible for the killing of prisoners of war in violation of the laws and usages of war, when troops under his command killed eleven Canadian prisoners of war, other than those referred to in the above charges at his Headquarters at L'Ancienne Abbaye Ardenne."

The book states further:

"The Court had found Meyer guilty of inciting and counselling his troops to deny quarter, and of responsibility for the killing of eighteen prisoners at his Headquarters on June 7 and 8."

General Harry Foster, as President of the Court, pronounced judgement and sentence as follows:

"Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer, the Court has found you guilty.
The sentence of the Court is that you suffer death by being shot.
The findings of Guilty and the sentence are subject to confirmation.
The proceedings are now closed."

VOICE 7: This aspect of the war in Normandy is covered by the British historian, Alexander McKee in his book *Caen: Anvil of Victory*, and reported in the Reader's Digest, *The Canadians at War*, in the following terms:

"Alexander McKee said that, in individual narratives and regimental division histories, there are frequent reports of no quarter given on either side from late June on.

"Other witnesses, wrote McKee, were equally emphatic in declaring the opposite: they have never witnessed the deliberate execution of prisoners - deliberate, as opposed to accidental shootings or misunderstandings."

CLIFF: **There are some very important statements in *The Valour and The Horror* about the shooting of prisoners of war. In one place the narrator states:**

"While the German atrocity in this garden and others like it were prosecuted, reports of Allied atrocities against Germans were never pursued. The message seems clear. War crimes committed in a good cause are politically acceptable -- perhaps regrettable -- but such crimes are persecuted only on the side that loses the war."

Please, please let's look at the historical accuracy of that statement.

VOICE 4: Although it does not seem to be well-known, the German government, by decree of September 4 1939, established a "War Crimes Bureau." The terms of reference are quoted in the book, *The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau*, by Alfred M. de Zayas, an American graduate of the Harvard Law School, now employed by the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations in Geneva.

The establishment of the Bureau is explained, as follows:

"The decree of September 4 1939 gave the War Crimes Bureau authority to investigate enemy violations of international law."

No evidence of shooting of Germans by Canadians was ever uncovered.

The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau reports on the shooting of Canadians as follows:

"Following the Allied landing in Normandy on June 4 1944, when numerous British, Canadian, and American units reported that the Germans were taking no prisoners, it did not take long for the governments of Great Britain and the United States to appeal to the Protecting Power.

"The governments of Great Britain, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India demanded that an immediate searching investigation be made. Another protest note dated September 7, 1944 described an incident involving the killing of seven Canadian soldiers at or near Mouen, Normandy on or about June 17, 1944."

Germany continued to pursue its investigations of the killing of Canadian POWs, but the de Zayas book concludes on this subject as follows:

"On February 28 1945 the German Foreign Office again consulted the Wehrmacht operations staff, but the results are unknown. In view of the impending collapse of the Reich, it is doubtful that the inquiry was actually pursued any further."

CONCLUSION

CLIFF: So what is this film all about? Well, it's an attempt to uncover some of the inaccuracies in *The Valour and The Horror*, a film which the directors and the writers have said is "bulletproof", from the stand point of historical research. I think probably we have been able to bring out quite a few instances where those accuracies have been seriously questioned. Not by veterans, oh yes, veterans were disturbed about the film. The inaccuracies though have been brought out in the writings of published authors, of people who either served in the RAF or more importantly have made their living since then as war historians.

I hope you like this film. If you have any comments, I invite you to write to *The War Amputations of Canada*. I'm Cliff Chadderton, thank you very much.